Perfect
But, it says then Discardings, ' ' when thinking that all false age, was necessary that, I that I thought, was some thing; observing that this truth: I think, then I exist was so firm and so certain, that all the fanciest assumptions of the skeptics were not capable to shake it, I judged that it could receive it as the first principle from the philosophy that I procurava' '. Discardings understood, thus, that he was ' ' a substance whose essence, or nature, consists of pensar' ' that ' ' to be, it does not need place some, nor depends on thing some material' '. In consequence, I, the soul, that the philosopher allows to be what he is, a thinker, is entirely distinct of the body, whose knowledge is more easy than of the body, therefore exactly that he left to exist, the soul would not leave of to be what it is. It concludes, then, that, as well as most perfect it cannot be perfect consequence of the least, and, nothing to be able to come, such idea, of the perfect being, or of the perfection of the being, it only can have been ece of fish in us for a more perfect nature of what ours, and that it includes all the perfeies, wants to say, God. In consequence, it concludes: ' ' it is for so certain me that God, who is this perfect being, is or exists, certain quo could be any demonstration of geometria.' ' The rule, in accordance with which the conceived things clear and distinct are all true ones, only can be guaranteed by the existence of God, to be perfect, from which we receive everything what it is found in us. The conception of world and man of Discardings if bases on the division of the nature in two opposing domnios: of the mind or the spirit (reverse speeds cogitans), ' ' thing pensante' ' , and of the substance (reverse speeds extensive), ' ' thing extensa' '.